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Summary
December 1, 1996 a new law was implemented in Portugal to gradually reduce the standard work-
week from 44 to 40 h. We study how this mandatory reduction affected employment through job
creation and job destruction. There was considerable regional, sectoral and firm-size variation in
the share of workers who were affected by the working hours reduction. We exploit this variation
to assess the impact of the workweek reduction. We find evidence that the working hours reduc-
tion had a positive effect on employment through a fall in job destruction.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Employment effects of working hours reductions are not easy to establish
empirically and indeed previous studies examine the impact of working hours
reduction on the employment position of individuals but do not address over-
all employment effects. The main reason for the lack of evidence on the over-
all employment effects concerns the lack of information about the number
of workers that find new jobs through the birth of firms. At the individ-
ual level it is rather straightforward to use workers working above the “new"
standard hours before the policy change as the treatment group and workers
working at or below the “new" standard hours before the policy change as a
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control group. However, establishing the overall employment effects is a non-
trivial exercise as there is no control group for firms that were created after
the introduction of the policy change. In this paper we attempt to establish
the comprehensive employment effects by performing an analysis at the level
of well defined labor markets.
In Portugal December 1, 1996 a new law was implemented aiming to grad-
ually reduce the standard workweek from 44 to 40 h. The main reason for
implementing this mandatory reduction of working hours was to speed up
convergence of Portuguese traditionally long hours of work to the European
average. In a companion paper we investigated how the Portuguese working
time reduction affected individual jobs (Raposo and Van Ours 2010). In the
current paper we investigate the overall employment effects. There was consid-
erable regional, sectoral and firm-size variation in the share of workers who
were affected by the working hours reduction. If the reduction in working
hours affected employment it is likely to have had a bigger impact when the
share of affected workers was high. Therefore, we can exploit the variation
across labor markets to assess the impact of the workweek reduction. To do
so we perform an analysis on the level of labor markets defined by industry,
region and firm size. This aggregate approach allows us to study job creation
and job destruction as well as worker accessions and separations and thus the
net employment effects.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
reduction of the workweek in Portugal. Section 3 discusses the economics of
working hours both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Sec-
tion 4 presents our data. In Sect. 5 we report the results of our empirical anal-
ysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 THE REDUCTION OF THE WORKWEEK IN PORTUGAL
In Portugal, the 1990s were a decade with low unemployment rates; approxi-
mately 3–4% points below the EU-15 average. Portugal is considered to have
a regulated and centralized labor market, with minimum wages, strong
employment protection, and collective bargaining widely applied (Cardoso
2006). The Portuguese government defines by law the limits to the standard
number of hours of work per week.
In December 1996, a new law was introduced with the aim of reducing
the standard workweek from 44 to 40 h. The law was not passed as a tool to
create jobs and reduce unemployment but was introduced because the newly-
elected government wanted to speed up the convergence of Portuguese tradi-
tionally long hours of work to the European average (Vareja˜o 2005).
1 In a similar set-up Stewart (2002) exploits regional variation in wages across the UK to
establish the impact of the introduction of the minimum wage.
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The new law implied first, by 1st December 1996, all workweeks above 42 h
should be reduced by 2 h; workweeks below 42 h but above 40 h should meet
the new standard of 40 h per week. Second, by 1st December 1997, all work-
weeks still above 40 h should meet the standard.
In order to compensate firms for the reduction in working hours the new
law introduced some flexibility. The reduction was implemented taking into
account that the standard workweek could be defined on a 4months aver-
age. Furthermore, the maximum number of daily working hours could be
increased by 2 provided that it did not exceed 10 h per day and 50 h per week.
3 ECONOMICS OF WORKING HOURS REDUCTION
3.1 Theory
Shorter working hours may be introduced through mandatory laws or may
be the result of bargaining between unions and firms (See also Boeri and
Van Ours 2008). A reduction of the workweek can be introduced for sev-
eral reasons. Shorter working hours may increase the standards of living or
it may be according to preferences of workers. Sometimes work sharing, i.e.
reductions in the length of the working week leading to more jobs, is moti-
vated as a tool to reduce unemployment. The idea is that if working time per
worker is reduced then employment, counted as the number of workers will
increase. This of course is only true if the reduction of the working hours
does not affect labor demand too much—i.e. if there is a ‘lump of labor’
which can simply be redistributed at no costs. In a competitive labor market it
may be that workers want to organize a reduction in working hours because
this would increase their marginal product of labor (Marimon and Zillibotti
2000). The mandatory reduction of working hours would give the workers
market power so they could increase their wage. Of course, individual workers
would like to deviate from the agreement and work longer hours at the higher
wage—in the same way as producers have an incentive to deviate from a car-
tel agreement. Another reason for a mandatory reduction of working hours
arises when employers have monopsony power. Manning (2003) argues that
in a monopsony not only the wage rate is less than the value of marginal
product but the firm can also induce the worker to work more than would
be optimal for the worker given the monopsony wage. In the same way as a
minimum wage can be welfare improving in case of a monopsony, working
hours reduction can be welfare improving.
Whatever the reason for a working hours reduction, the question arises if
there is an employment effect. From a theoretical point of view it is not obvi-
ous whether working hours reductions will increase or reduce
employment. Lets assume that technology is represented by a Cobb–Doug-
las production function Y = Hγ N where 0<γ <1, which implies that output
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is proportional to the number of workers while due to physical constraints
there are diminishing returns to hours of work in production. Labor costs per
worker are given by
W =b +wH + θw(H − Hs)d (1)
where Hs is the standard working hours, d is a dummy variable that has a
value of 1 if H ≥ Hs and a value of zero otherwise, b represents the fixed costs
per worker that are independent of working hours. These are mainly the costs
of hiring, firing as well as training costs, w is the hourly wage rate, θ(θ > 0)
is the overtime premium. Assuming a competitive product market with price
equal to 1, the expression for the profits of the firm is given by
Π(H, N )= Hγ N − W N (2)
The firm chooses H and N such that profits are maximized. The first order
conditions for a maximum are:
∂Π
∂N
= Hγ −b −wHs − θw(H − Hs)d =0 (3)
∂Π
∂H
=γ Hγ−1N −w(1+ θd)N =0 (4)
Solving these two equations we obtain the optimal number of hours as:
H∗ = γ (b − θwHsd)
(1−γ )w(1+ θd) (5)
When the standard number of hours is reduced the employment effects depend
on the new optimal number of hours (H∗∗). We distinguish three situations:
1. If H∗∗ < Hnews , ∂N∂Hs = ∂H∂Hs =0.
2. If Hnews ≤ H∗∗ ≤ Holds , ∂N∂Hs = ∂H∂Hs =0 or ∂N∂Hs <0, ∂H∂Hs >0.
3. If H∗∗ > Holds , then ∂N∂Hs >0,
∂H
∂Hs <0.
Situation 1 occurs when the optimal number of hours is below the new stan-
dard; situation 2 occurs when the optimal hours are higher than the new stan-
dard but lower than the old standard and situation 3 occurs when the optimal
number of hours is higher than the old standard.
Under situation 1 the optimal number of hours is independent of the stan-
dard number of hours.2 Therefore the change in the standard number of
hours does not affect the level of employment. If the new optimal hours
2 Note that if in Eq. 5 there are no overtime hours d =0, in which case the optimal number
of working hours is given by H∗ = bγ
w(1−γ ) .
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choice is in situation 2 the employment effects depend on the overtime pre-
mium and the fixed labor costs (see also Calmfors and Hoel 1988). For illus-
trative purposes consider the following example. A firm has N workers work-
ing 42 h at a wage w with fixed costs b. So total wage costs are N ∗ (42 ∗
w + b). Assume that as in Portugal, the standard workweek is reduced from
44 to 40 h while the total labor input is unaffected. Now the firm has to
choose between attracting new workers in which case the total wage costs
become 4240 N ∗ (w ∗ 40+ b). Or, the firm doesn’t do anything, which implies
that it has to pay for overtime work for which premium is 50% (as is the case
in Portugal for the first overtime hour). Then, the total wage costs become
N ∗ (40 ∗ w + 2 ∗ 1.5 ∗ w + b). It is straightforward to see that the firm will
expand its workforce if b < 20 ∗ w while it will leave hours and employment
unaffected if b >20∗w. Note that this threshold is quite high as it is equiva-
lent to half of the weekly wage. This makes it very likely that firms will follow
the first strategy, i.e. reduce working hours and expand the workforce.
In situation 3, workers already worked overtime and the hours reduction
causes employment to fall. This is because the hours reduction has made the
employment of a worker more expensive while the price of marginal hours
has not changed. Therefore, firms will reduce the production factor which
became more expensive (employees) and will use more of the input of which
price has not changed (hours). Heterogenous firms may react differently to a
reduction in standard working hours, which makes it difficult to predict the
economy-wide employment effects.
3.2 Empirical Findings
Empirical studies find little evidence of working hours reductions leading to
the creation of jobs. For Germany, Hunt (1999) finds no positive employ-
ment effects of the gradual working time reduction that occurred in the 1980s
and 1990s. Andrews et al. (2005) also find no evidence of positive employ-
ment effects of working hours reduction in Germany. For France, Cre´pon
and Kramarz (2002) study the 1982 reduction of the workweek in France
from 40 to 39 h finding that it didn’t create jobs but increased unemployment.
Esteva˜o and Sa´ (2008) study the further reduction of the workweek in France
from 39 to 35 h in 2000–2002. They find an increase in labor turnover but
no effect on aggregate employment. Skuterud (2007) presents an analysis of
the Canadian province of Quebec where the standard workweek was gradu-
ally reduced from 44 to 40 h concluding that the policy failed to raise employ-
ment. Vareja˜o (2005) investigates the effects of a 1996 working time reduction
in Portugal using establishment level data and finding that firms’ reaction to
the policy is affected by the presence of minimum wage earners and the use of
overtime hours. Chemin and Wasmer (2009) explore geographic disparities to
study the 1998–2000 35-h reform in France. They use the historical difference
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TABLE 1 – MEANS OF VARIABLES (ANNUAL PERCENTAGES)
1994–1995 1995–1996 1996–1997 1996–1998
e 3.9 3.7 6.6 5.2
JC 18.7 18.6 20.4 19.4
JD 14.8 14.9 13.8 14.2
WA 37.1 36.6 38.6 37.5
WS 33.1 32.9 32.2 32.5
of the region Alsace-Moselle as control group finding no significant impact of
the 35-h reform on employment growth. Raposo and Van Ours (2010) ana-
lyze the effect of the Portuguese working time reduction on working hours,
overtime hours, hourly wages, monthly earnings and individual job loss. This
study finds that for workers who were affected by the new law working hours
decreased, while hourly wages increased, keeping monthly earnings approxi-
mately constant. Furthermore, the working hours reduction reduced the job
loss of workers directly affected. Finally, overtime hours hardly changed. In
terms of our theoretical framework this implies that situation 2 is the most
likely situation: the reduction in standard hours reduced actual hours. Thus,
it seems likely that firms expanded their workforce. Sa´nchez (2009) studying
the 2001 reduction of standard weekly working hours from 48 to 45 h in Chile
finds that this did not have positive or negative employment effects.
4 DATA
We use a longitudinal data set matching firms and workers in the Portuguese
economy, called Quadros de Pessoal (QP—“Lists of Personnel”). The Quad-
ros de Pessoal data are collected annually by the Ministry of Employment
through an inquiry that every establishment with wage-earners is legally
obliged to fill in. Reported data cover all the personnel working for the estab-
lishment in a reference week in October. Every year QP gather information
for more than two hundred thousand firms and two million workers (see
Cardoso 2006) for more details). Our data cover the period 1994 until 1998.
In order to estimate the impact of the reduction in hours on the overall level
of employment we aggregate the firms to the level of labor markets defined by
industry (seven categories), region (four categories) and size of the firm (three
categories). Thus, we perform our analysis at the level of 84 labor markets.3
Table 1 shows the means of the variables we use in the analysis.
3 For some of these labor markets we didn’t use information about all years. We removed
some outliers, where the change in job creation rate and employment growth was strongly neg-
ative.
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We define job and worker flows as usual (Davis and Haltiwanger 1999). We
denote the level of employment at firm j in period t as e jt ; the average num-
ber of employees at the start and the end of the period. We denote the change
of employment at firm j during period t as e jt ; the change is calculated as
the difference between the number of workers at the end of the period and
the number of workers at the beginning of the period. The job destruction







e j t (6)
where S−t represents the subset of firms with e jt < 0. In the same way job








e j t (7)
where S+t represents the subset of firms with e jt > 0. These measures of
job flows underestimate the true values of gross job destruction and creation.
Even if at the level of an individual firm employment change equals zero there
might be some job creation and job destruction going on. With heteroge-
neous workers, jobs and firms making the distinction between job and worker
flows is fundamental.
If F is the number of workers that left the firm in a particular period, and
H denotes the number of workers that entered the firm in that period, worker
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By definition, it holds that:
JCt − J Dt = W At − W St =et (10)
A surviving firm is a firm that is reported in our data in both, 1996 and in
the current year (t). The birth of a new firm is reported if it is the first time
this firm is reported in our data. We consider there exists a firm closure if a
firm is reported as having gone out of business at time t if that year is the
first year it fails to report.
Table 2 shows that total job creation in the period October 1994–1995
was 17% while in the year thereafter it was 15%. Job creation increased
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TABLE 2 – JOB fLOWS AND WORKER FLOWS; 1994–1998
Firm Firm Firm Firm Total job Total job Net Worker Worker
new expansion contraction closure creation destruction employment accession separation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1 + 2) (3+ 4) (5) (6)
1994–1995 8 9 6 7 17 14 3 33 30
1995–1996 7 8 7 8 15 15 0 31 31
1996–1997 10 9 6 7 18 13 5 35 30
1997–1998 9 9 6 9 18 15 3 34 31
Note: Change in employment between two subsequent dates as percentage of the average employ-
ment at these two dates; October data
to 18% in the period October 1996–1997 and October 1997–1998. On the
other hand total job destruction in the period October 1994–1995 and Octo-
ber 1995–1996 was around 14–15% while it decreased to 13% in the period
October 1996–1997. In the year thereafter job destruction increased again to
15%. Thus, immediately after the policy was implemented in December 1996
job creation increased and job destruction decreased causing net employment
to increase 5%. In the year thereafter job creation was constant while job
destruction increased somewhat, causing employment to grow 3%. Of course,
these developments in job flows and worker flows may have been affected by
the working hours reduction, but they may also be influenced by changes in
the Portuguese economy. In an economy known to be characterized by very
high levels of firm creation and firm closures (Mata and Portugal 1994) it is
not strange to see that after 1996, job creation increased mainly through new
firms. The main reason behind the decrease of the job destruction is not so
clear, firm closure or firm contraction. The last two columns in Table 2 show
that worker accessions fluctuate more than worker separations. It is also clear
that worker turnover rates are high. Every year about one third of all Por-
tuguese workers leave their job and find a new job.4
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Set-Up of the Analysis
By using market level data we can take the creation of new firms in a par-
ticular market into account because they are part of employment creation in
that market. The way these labor markets are affected by the working hours
reduction depends on how many workers are affected within these labor mar-
4 Blanchard and Portugal (2001) argue that those high turnover rates in Portugal are related
to the small size of firms in Portugal.
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Figure 1 – Market level distribution of the share of workers working more than 40 h per week;
October 1994–1996 (percentages)
kets.5 As a definition of policy intensity we use a variable n, defined as the
share of affected workers—in each of the 84 labor markets—working more
than 40 h at the relevant October dates. The distribution of n in the period
October 1994–October 1996, shortly before the working hours reduction, is
presented in Fig. 1. Clearly the policy intensity varies a lot between the dif-
ferent labor markets. Over time there are some changes in the distribution but
by and large the distribution of n in various years looks very much alike.
To analyze the year 1 effects of the working week reduction in labor mar-
ket k represented by industry, region, size we estimate the following equation:
ykt =αt +αk +βnkt + δnkt ·dp + kt (11)
The dependent variables are job creation rate (JC), job destruction rate (JD),
worker accession rate (WA) and worker separation rate (WS) and change in
employment (e) from t to t +1, where t runs from October 1994 to October
1996. Furthermore, the αt represents calendar time fixed effects, the αk rep-
resent time-invariant labor market fixed effects, dp represents a dummy vari-
able for the post reform period, and n represents the share of individuals that
worked more than 40 h in October of year t . The main parameter of interest
is δ, representing the treatment effect. Finally,  represents an error term.
5 Obviously, the hourly wage may have been affected by the reduction of standard working
hours. However, this doesn’t affect our reduced form analysis, in which we relate the change
in standard working hours to the employment effect without attempting to distinguish between
the various determinants of this change.
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5.2 Exploratory Analysis
To give an idea about the relationship between the share of workers work-
ing more than 40 h per week and employment growth, job creation and job
destruction Fig. 2 presents an exploratory analysis. The horizontal axis shows
the share of workers working more than 40 h per week in October 1996,
shortly before the mandatory reduction in the standard working week was
implemented. The vertical axis shows changes in the period October 1996–
October 1997 in employment growth (panel a), job creation (panel b) and job
destruction (panel c).
As shown in panel a of Fig. 2 the higher share of 40+ h workers, the
higher the change in employment growth. The slope of the straight lines in
Fig. 2 represent an estimate for δ.6 Indeed, the slope is positive in panel a
indicating that the larger the share of workers involved in the reduction of
the standard workweek the higher employment growth.
Panel b shows that there is no such relationship with job creation, while
from panel c it is clear that job destruction is affected by the reduction of the
standard workweek: the larger the share of workers involved in the reduction
of the standard workweek the lower the change in job destruction.
5.3 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for δ from Eq. 11 estimated over the period 1994–
1997 are presented in the first column of Table 3. As shown the change in
employment is significantly affected. The higher n, the higher employment
growth. Conditional on the other characteristics of the labor market, an aver-
age labor market with an n of 0.5 experiences an employment growth of
almost 5%. As shown, job creation and worker accessions are not affected
by the reduction of the standard workweek. But, job destruction and work-
ers separations are negatively affected. Apparently, labor markets confronted
with a reduction of the standard workweek reduce job destruction and thus
increase employment. This would be in line with predictions from the theo-
retical model. Limiting the estimation period to 1995–1997 hardly affects the
parameter estimates (column 2).
6 Note that if we take first differences of Eq. 11 over the period 1995–1996 we find:
yk,95−96 =α96 −α95 +β(nk,96 −nk,95)+ δnk,96 + k,96 − k,95 (12)
such that if n didn’t change too much between 1995 and 1996 we find:
yk,95−96 ≈α∗ + δnk,96 + ∗ (13)
In a linear regression we find for δ (absolute t-statistics based on robust standard errors): panel
a: 0.090 (1.8), panel b: 0.017 (0.6), panel c :−0.074 (2.2).
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Figure 2 – Changes in employment growth, job creation and job destruction; 1996–1997.
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TABLE 3 – BASELINE ESTIMATES
1 Year effect 2 Years effect
1994–1997 1995–1997 1994–1998 1995–1998
(1) (2) (3) (4)
e 0.097 (2.1)** 0.125 (2.2)** 0.091 (1.8)* 0.110 (1.8)*
JC 0.013 (0.5) 0.012 (0.4) 0.006 (0.2) −0.002 (0.1)
JD −0.084 (3.1)** −0.113 (3.3)** −0.085 (2.4)** −0.113 (2.5)**
WA 0.020 (0.6) 0.030 (0.9) −0.004 (0.1) −0.007 (0.2)
WS −0.082 (2.3)** −0.096 (2.1)** −0.097 (2.2)** −0.117 (2.2)**
Observations 249 165 250 165
Labor markets 84 84 84 84
Note: All estimates also have the share of 40+ h workers (n) as explanatory variable in addition
to labor market fixed effects (84) and calendar period fixed effects (3); absolute t-statistics based
on robust (cluster) standard errors in parentheses (Bertrand et al. 2004); a **/* indicates that the
coefficient is different from zero at a 5%/10% level of significance
Replacing ykt for t = 1996 in Eq. 11 by the averages for the period 1996–
1998 we also estimated the year 2 effects of the working hours reduction. The
parameter estimates are presented in the third and fourth column of Table 3.
The results are very much the same as before.
The market level analysis allows us to make a distinction between worker
accessions to new firms and worker accessions to firms that survive. Similarly,
we can make a distinction between worker separations from firm closures and
worker separations from surviving firms. Table 4 also shows how the work-
ing hours reductions affects the flow of workers to and from these different
types of firms. The working hours reduction mainly affects worker flows to
new firms and from firm closures. Conditional on the other characteristics
of the labor market, firms being born and dying on an average labor mar-
ket with an n of 0.5 experience an employment growth of almost 5% after
1 year where half of this effect comes from worker separations and half comes
from worker accessions. After 2 years the effect on net employment is positive
but smaller (3.5%) and it comes mainly from the reduction of worker separa-
tions. The effects to and from surviving firms are much smaller after 1 year
but after 2 years the effects are very similar.
We performed two types of sensitivity analysis relating to our measure of
policy intensity and relating to our definition of labor market. In our baseline
estimates our policy intensity parameter is measured by the share of work-
ers working more than 40 h. As an alternative policy intensity indicator we
used the per worker average number of hours in excess of 40 h. In our base-
line estimates we distinguish labor markets according to industry, region and
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TABLE 4 – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS; DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SURVIVING
FIRMS AND FIRMS BEING BORN/DYING
1 Year effect 2 Years effect
1994–1997 1995–1997 1994–1998 1995–1998
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firms being born and dying
e 0.089 (2.6)** 0.112 (2.6)** 0.061 (1.8)* 0.083 (2.1)**
WA 0.045 (1.9)* 0.048 (1.8)* 0.019 (0.9) 0.019 (0.8)
WS −0.044 (2.7)** −0.064 (2.7)** −0.042 (1.9)* −0.064 (2.2)**
Surviving firms
e 0.008 (0.3) 0.013 (0.4) 0.030 (1.1) 0.027 (0.8)
WA −0.025 (0.9) −0.019 (0.7) −0.024 (0.8) −0.026 (0.8)
WS −0.038 (1.4) −0.032 (1.0) −0.055 (2.1)** −0.052 (1.7)*
Observations 249 165 250 165
Labor markets 84 84 84 84
Note: See footnote Table 3
firm size. As a sensitivity analysis we ignored the distinction by firm size. This
reduces the number of labor markets from 84 to 28. For both sensitivity anal-
yses we find that the relevant parameter estimates are very much the same as
before. From this, we conclude that our parameter estimates are quite robust.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Previous empirical studies suggest that reductions of standard working hours
do not have positive employment effects. However, previous studies only mea-
sure partial employment effect while in our study we consider overall employ-
ment effects. We study the working hours reduction that was introduced in
Portugal in 1996. In our analysis we exploit regional, sectoral and firm-size
variation in the share of workers who were affected by the working hours
reduction. A working hours reduction is likely to have had a bigger impact
when the share of affected workers was high. To investigate this we perform
an analysis on the level of labor markets defined by industry, region and firm
size. We find evidence that the working hours reduction had a positive effect
on employment through a fall in job destruction. The reduced labor costs
didn’t stimulate job creation which may have to do with the strict employment
protection in Portugal. We can only speculate about the reason why reducing
standard working hours in Portugal increased employment whereas in other
countries no such effects occurred. Most likely, the increased flexibility in the
use of the standard workweek made it easier to adjust the workforce at the
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intensive margin rather than at the extensive margin. To the extent that this
reduced labor costs, job destruction was reduced, causing positive employ-
ment effects.
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